Implications of the Release of Chibok Girls on Nigeria’s  War on Terrorism by Osasumwen, Olanrewaju Faith et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Covenant University Journal of Politics & Internationall Affairs. Vol. 5, No.1, June, 2017            
 
An Open Access Journal - Available Online 
 
 
 
Implications of the Release of Chibok Girls on Nigeria’s 
War on Terrorism 
 
Olanrewaju Faith Osasumwen
1
; Olanrewaju Adekunle
2
, 
Loromeke Ejiroghene Roland
3
 & Joshua Segun
4
 
 
 
1,2,3,4
Department of Political Science and International Relations, 
Covenant University, Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria 
Faith.oviasogie@covenantuniversity.edu.ng
1
;  
Adekunle.shodipo@covenantuniversity.edu.ng
2
 
Roland.loromeke@covenantuniversity.edu.ng
3
;  
segun.joshua@covenantuniversity.edu.ng
4 
 
Abstract: The year 2013 marked the emergence of the use of women and 
girls as hostages by the most dreaded Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria. 
The successful abduction of about 300 girls from the Government Girls 
Secondary School, Chibok-Borno State, Nigeria, in the dead of the night 
boosted the effrontery of the sect to undertake more abduction of hundreds of 
girls and women even in broad day light in North-Eastern Nigeria. The 
abduction of the Chibok girls generated both national and international 
concerns and raised the recognition of the group‟s ruthlessness against 
women. Various attempts to rescue the Chibok girls by the Nigerian 
government, humanitarian agencies and the international community failed. 
Using qualitative descriptive analysis, the paper avows that the controversial 
release of 21 Chibok girls without battle conditions or reports leaves a lot to 
speculation. This event represents a symbolism of Boko Haram‟s ability to 
hold the Nigerian government to ransom at its own terms. It submits that the 
gradual release of the girls and the sect‟s proposal for the negotiation of 83 
more girls raises questions on the terms of the negotiations leading to the 
release as well as queries the strength of Nigeria‟s anti-terrorism war. The 
paper recommends that because the release of the 21 hostages may not be the 
ultimate goal of Boko Haram, the Nigerian state should consciously 
negotiate on well calculated intelligence and use experts in future negotiation 
with terror groups in order to construct outcomes that is better than the status 
quo. 
Keywords: Boko Haram; Chibok girls; Insurgency; Negotiation; War on 
Terror; #BringBackOurGirls  
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 Introduction 
Terrorism is the “propaganda of the 
deed” (Laqueur, 1999:43) and 
“propaganda by deed” (Weinberg and 
Eubank, 2006:3). This connotes the 
publicity of the agenda of terrorist 
groups by their actions. Actions that 
have serious public impacts tends to 
have critical impact beyond the effects 
they have on the immediate targets. Such 
action are expected to provoke other 
actions from followers through its 
messages. Of all the strategies of 
insurgency, terrorism has been the 
chosen choice of insurgency obtainable 
to both religious and political insurgents. 
The propaganda effects or impacts of the 
choice of terrorism over other forms of 
insurgency such as coup d‟etat and 
guerrilla war amongst others make it use 
deliberate (Agara, 2015).  
 
The relationship between terrorism and 
gender has been explored by terrorist 
organisations. Terror groups have 
propagated their agenda and impacts via 
direct and deliberate attacks on females. 
Nowadays, religious based terror groups 
are committing violence against women 
than have been ever witnessed in history. 
For various reasons women have become 
battlegrounds to be conquered 
(Barkindo, Gudaku and Wesley, 2013). 
Terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda, 
Islamic State of Iraq and Levant, 
Hezbollah and Al-Shabaab have adopted 
the instrument of gender to expand the 
intensity of propaganda of their deeds, 
ensure the smooth running of their 
organisational activities and as weapon 
of power (Sharoni, Welland and Steiner, 
2016).  
 
Since 2013, Boko Haram has 
significantly contributed to gendered 
violence against women (Osita-Njoku 
and Chikere, 2015). The reasons for the 
rise of gender based violence (GBV),  
 
abduction and use of women by the 
terror group is the declaration of the state 
of emergency by Goodluck Jonathan in 
May 2013 (Zenn and Pearson, 2014; 
Bloom and Matfess, 2016). The 
submission of Omego (2015:87) is quite 
different. He argues that the tactics of 
kidnapping by the sect began after a raid 
by the federal forces in which close 
relations of suspected members of the 
sect were arrested. According to 
Barkindo, Gudaku, and Wesley (2013: 
22) as cited in Zenn and Pearson (2014) 
and Gilbert (n.d:1-5), during the raid, 
over a hundred women including the 
wives of Abubakar Shekau, the leader of 
Boko Haram were arrested. Shekau, after 
this issued a threat in January 2012 to 
engage in a gender based abduction 
centered mainly on the kidnap of women 
“enemies” in return (Associated Press, 
January 27, 2012). The Vanguard (2013) 
avows that, Shekau also threatened that 
“no one in the country will enjoy his 
women and children” if the relatives of 
Boko Haram members were not released. 
Although the second part of the threat 
which is to spread the terror against 
women to all parts of Nigeria has not 
been implemented since then, yet the 
victimisation of women and GBV 
became an overt aspect of the activities 
of the Boko Haram in the northeast 
(Zenn and Pearson, 2014:46-53; Human 
Rights Watch, 2014:3-4). Most of the 
abductions have been carried out in 
Borno state, the hottest zone of the 
insurgency in North-East Nigeria. Boko 
Haram‟s adopted kidnapping tactics is 
similar to that of Al-Shabaab used in the 
Horn of Africa and Al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Maiangwa 
and Amao, 2015).  
 
Hostages have tactical values. Terrorist 
organisations embrace sexual terrorism 
against their hostages for various 
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reasons; sex slaves, subjection of victims 
to rape and early marriage; the 
manipulation and control of the 
government and some part of the 
audience; and sometimes they are assets 
often used as negotiation tools (Osita-
Njoku and Chikere, 2015; Buba, 2015 
p.1-12; Yesevi, 2014; Pratt, 2004). The 
spontaneous rise in the use of females 
for the accomplishment of suicide 
bombing missions at the dawn of the 
intensification of female abductions 
explains that the abduction of women 
and girls by Boko Haram is for 
instrumental purpose such as the 
furtherance of the agenda of the Boko 
Haram and the weakening of Nigeria‟s 
war against terror. Therefore, this paper 
seeks to interrogate the politics and 
intricacies surrounding the negotiation 
between the Nigerian government and 
Boko Haram for the release of the 21 
Chibok girls as well as discuss it effects 
on Nigeria‟s anti-terror war. It questions 
why Boko Haram after series of failed 
negotiations with the Nigerian state 
suddenly agreed on a deal of releasing 
21 of the abducted Chibok girls. The 
paper is therefore structured into six sub-
headings. Section one serves as the 
introduction; the second part addresses 
the methodology and theoretical 
framework; part three discusses the 
concepts germane to the study; part four 
provides an overview on the abduction 
of the Chibok girls and the various 
reactions that ensued afterwards from the 
national and global contexts; section five 
tackles the implications of the politics 
surrounding the  release of the 21 
Chibok girls on Nigeria‟s anti-terror war 
while the six sub-heading concludes the 
work and provides recommendations for 
more effective anti-terror war in Nigeria. 
 
Methodology 
This paper relies on secondary data 
obtained from journals, conference 
proceedings, monographs, textbook and 
internet sources. The data sourced 
through these were analysed through the 
employment of qualitative descriptive 
analysis with the backdrop of the 
Eastonian Systems theory which 
explains the solidity of the political 
system as a function of the ability of the 
system to convert the inputs (demands 
and supports) to outputs (authoritative 
decisions) that please majority of the 
people. 
Conceptual Clarification 
The Concept of Terrorism 
Although terrorism has become a global 
phenomenon, the acceptance of a 
common definition amongst scholars has 
been difficult. Attempts to define the 
concepts have instigated arguments 
amongst scholars (Ifemeje, Ewulum and 
Ibekwe, 2015; Agra, 2015; Joshua and 
Chidozie, 2014). The reason for this 
could be traced to the various context 
within which the term has been used. To 
arrive at common grounds, attempts to 
define terrorism has been grouped into 
two: academic definitions and official 
definitions.  A number of official 
definitions have been compiled by 
Schmid and Jongman (2005). The 
United States (US) Vice President‟s 
1986 task force defined terrorism as “the 
unlawful use or threat of violence against 
persons or property to further political or 
social objectives. It is generally intended 
to intimidate or coerce a government, 
individuals or groups to modify their 
behaviour or policies” (Chaliand and 
Blin, 2007 p.14). US State Department 
defines it as a premeditated politically 
motivated violence perpetuated against 
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non-combatant targets by sub-national 
groups of clandestine agents, usually 
intended to influence as audience (Gadd, 
Karstedt and Messner, 2011p.192). The 
Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) states that terrorism is “any 
activity that involves an act that is 
dangerous to human life or potentially 
destructive of critical infrastructure or 
key resources; and … must also appear 
to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce 
a civilian population, (ii) to influence the 
policy of a government by intimidation 
or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct 
of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination or kidnapping” (Gadd, 
Karstedt and Messner, 2011 p.192). The 
definition by the Department of Defence 
and the DHS are more detailed than that 
of the US Vice President. While the 
definitions by the Department of 
Defence and DHS focuses on threat, the 
actual act of violence, the target of the 
whole society as well as the government. 
The Department of Defence however 
narrows the cause of terrorism to 
political reasons contrary to what is 
obtainable in some countries of the 
world. In modern times, reasons such as 
religion have been a serious cause of 
terrorism. This is exemplified in the case 
of the Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. 
The definition did not also distinguish 
between attacks on non-combatant 
civilians and on military combatant. 
Nevertheless, three commonalities can 
be discerned from these official 
definitions are the presence of political 
objectives; the use of violence; and the 
intention of creating fear in the target 
population.  
 
Agara (2015) avows that the academic 
definitions are diverse and complex. 
There are little consensus as to the root 
causes of terrorism, whether they bear 
economic, political and social symbol. 
Cline and Alexander (1986 p.32) 
contends that terrorism is the deliberate 
employment of violence or the use of 
violence by sovereign states as well as 
some national groups assisted by 
sovereign state in order to attain strategic 
and political objectives through the 
violation of law (cited in Prunckun, 1994 
p.22). Ladan (2014) avows that terrorism 
is the calculated use of violence (or 
threat of violence) against civilians or 
non-combatants, in order to attain goals 
that are political or religious or 
ideological in nature, which is done 
through intimidation of a population or 
government or an international 
organization or coercion or instilling fear 
to do or abstain from doing any act 
(cited in Ifemeje, Ewulum and Ibekwe, 
2015:40). Rourke (2008:316) has 
defined terrorism by attempting to 
highlight the features common to it thus; 
“terrorism is (1) violence; (2) carried out 
by individuals, nongovernmental 
organisations, or covert government 
agents or units; that (3) specifically 
target civilians; (4) uses clandestine 
attack methods, such as car bombs and 
hijacked airliners; and (5) attempts to 
influence politics.” From the above, it is 
clear that terrorism involves the 
perpetrator(s), the victim(s) and the 
target(s) of the violence. It is the use of 
various means and violence to achieve 
whether political, economic and social 
goals within a political environment. 
Terrorism as a social menace has had so 
much negative effects on human 
freedom, human inalienable rights and 
human security.  
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(a) War on Terror 
The “war on terror” is a response to the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on 
the United States (US). The concept was 
coined by former US President George 
Bush after the incident. National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism posits 
that war against terror is a long term 
battle against the “underlying conditions 
that promote the despair and the 
destructive visions of political change 
that lead people to embrace, rather than 
shun terrorism.” The strategies include 
four major goals which are to defeat 
terrorist organisations of global reach; 
deny further support, sponsorship and 
safe havens of terror groups; diminish 
the underlying conditions that are 
already stated above and defend the US, 
its citizens as well as its interest at home 
and abroad (National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism, 2003). The war 
on terror conceptualised by George Bush 
involves overt and covert military 
operations, the blockage of financial 
flows to terrorist groups and new 
security legislations. It involves attempts 
to mitigate the impacts of terrorism 
because ancient and current realities 
show that terrorism goes beyond 
identifying with an ideology to the 
impact of the ideology. Therefore, the 
war on terror involves engaging various 
avenues and strategies such as military, 
legal, political and ideological attempts 
to globally fight against terror groups 
themselves, the organisations and 
individuals supporting them with funds, 
arms, technology and logistics advices; 
destroying existing terrorist networks 
and preventing new ones from springing 
up.  
 
While George Bush‟s war on terror is a 
strategy to protect the US and its allies 
globally, the idea received the support of 
western powers such as Britain and other 
countries that envisaged the strategy as a 
way of boosting their national security. 
Through the platform of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
Counter Terrorism Committee, the US 
provided supports to African countries to 
implement the UNSC Resolution 1373 
that requires countries to suppress and 
prevent funding to terror groups, 
improve on border security, prevent and 
suppress recruitment by terror groups 
and prevent new and existing safe haven 
of terrorists (Abolurin, 2011:194).  
 
The presence of Boko Haram in Nigeria, 
terrorism in Mali, the existence of al-
Qaeda and the existence of the al-
Shabaab amongst others showcase 
evidences that the war on terror has not 
been globally successful although since 
the 9/11terror event, the US has not 
witnessed such massive spate of terror. 
However, the existence of terrible terror 
groups around the world as well as the 
socio-economic and psychological 
impacts they cause makes it logical to 
deduce that terrorism still remains an 
issue to the US ministry of defence and 
the UN Security Council. The war on 
terror has been very demanding on the 
Nigerian government due to the guerrilla 
nature of the Boko Haram activities and 
the loose network of its members. The 
declaration of the state of emergency, the 
emergence of civilian joint task force, 
the deployment of the use of force, 
negotiations and peace talks are 
strategies that have been employed. 
Trillions of naira have been gulped by 
Nigeria‟s war on terror.   
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(2) The Chibok Girls: Abduction 
and Reactions  
(a) The Chibok Girls Abduction 
Discourse 
 
In April 2014, Boko Haram adopted a 
new and notorious tactic of kidnapping 
female students and women in the north-
eastern part of Nigeria. It is also clear 
that this tactic is very similar to that of 
the Islamic Stata of Iraq (ISIL)‟s attacks 
on school girls in the areas it controlled 
in Iraq. The tragic story of the abduction 
of the Chibok girls began on the night of 
April 14 and 15, 2014 when Boko 
Haram laid siege on the Government 
Girls Secondary School Chibok (GSSC), 
a rural town in Borno State and 
kidnapped 276 students who were 
writing their final Secondary School 
Certificate Examination (SSCE) 
(Maiangwa and Amao, 2015). Disguised 
as security guards, the terrorists ordered 
the students out of their rooms for their 
own safety. The girls were seized from 
their dormitory and loaded in the back of 
trucks. While 57 of the girls narrowly 
escaped immediately after their 
abduction, 219 were still missing and 
under the control of Boko Haram 
(Richmond, 2015). It remains the largest 
single occurrence of abduction by Boko 
Haram (Human Rights Watch, 2014 
p.3).  
 
On May 5, 2014, Boko Haram leader 
Abubakar Shekau in a video took 
responsibility for the abduction of 
Chibok girls. He even threatened that 
more abductions would still occur. 
Shekau added that he would sell them in 
the market as slaves (Martel, 2014). He 
claimed that: 
 Allah instructed me to sell 
them...I will carry out his 
instructions. Slavery is 
allowed in my religion, and I 
shall capture people and make 
them slaves. He added: 
Western education is sin, it is 
forbidden, and women must go 
and marry. He said the girls 
should not have been in school 
and instead should have been 
married since girls as young as 
nine are suitable for marriage 
(cited in John, 2014). 
From a video released by Shekau, it is 
observed that some of the girls have 
been married off and some sold into 
slavery. Nevertheless, some accounts 
holds that they were smuggled into 
Cameroun and Chad through the porous 
borders (Peters, 2014:188). The success 
of the abduction of over 200 girls and 
the attention the sect received expedited 
the expansion of its propaganda both 
internationally and domestically. This 
encouraged the sect to engage in more of 
such sacrilegious act and depend on 
women operatives. It has been observed 
that: 
The abduction of the Chibok 
girls has become one of the 
high profile cases illustrating a 
phenomenon that has attracted 
increased attention and 
concern in recent years: 
violent targeted attacks on 
students, teachers and 
education institutions 
(Richmond, 2015). 
 
(b) Reactions to the Abduction of the 
Chibok girls 
The abduction of the Chibok girls stirred 
a lot of emotional reactions and rescue 
efforts from both local and international 
bodies as the Chibok abduction brought 
attention to the vulnerability of women 
and girls in Nigeria (Copeland, 2013). 
The first controversy that the issue 
ignited was on the weekend of April 19-
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20, 2014, when the Defence 
Headquarters falsified a report that over 
100 of the 129 figure that the ministry 
said was abducted were released. This 
was debunked by the GSSC Principal. 
The military was forced to retract this 
statement on April 21, 2014. Hope was 
dimmed at the inability of Goodluck 
Jonathan, Nigeria‟s immediate past 
president to rescue the girls. Then First 
Lady Patience Jonathan, although 
breaking protocol decided to intervene 
by summoning the GSSC principal, 
Chibok community leaders and some 
key figures in Borno State government 
to seek clarifications and amicable 
solution to the missing girls‟ conundrum. 
Her call was heeded only by the 
principal and a few others. This 
necessitated the tearful outburst: “Na 
only you waka come…” that popularised 
the issue. It also changed the dynamics 
and raised the tone of the agitation for 
their release.  
The prolonged case was heightened with 
somewhat confusion on the part of 
government on what rescue mechanisms 
should be adopted. A vehement military 
engagement with Boko Haram terrorism 
created a vacuum for several 
stakeholders to volunteer intervention. 
This birthed the Bring Back Our Girls 
(BBOG) movement that began as a “One 
Million Match for the Release of 
Abducted Chibok Girls”. The march was 
led by Ms. Hadiza Bala Usman, the 
present Director-general of Nigerian 
Ports Authority. The movement 
transformed to the BBOG with the 
appearance of Mrs. Oby Ezekwisili, 
former Minister of Education and World 
Bank Vice President, Africa, which gave 
the campaigning an international 
prominence, especially with the 
#BringBackOurGirls hash tag. Put 
differently, the frustration ignited by the 
initial determined and energetic response 
from the parents, Nigerian authorities 
and local advocates began the “Bring 
Back Our Girls” campaign. This 
popularised the #BringBackOurGirls 
movement and publicised the hashtag on 
social media. It demanded that Goodluck 
Jonathan mounts concerted strength to 
rescue the girls. The #Bringbackourgirls 
twitter phenomenon (campaign) had over 
3.3 million tweets from all over the 
globe (Buba, 2015). It boosted the 
conspicuousness of the girls‟ abduction 
and gained international support of well-
known figures such as Malala Yousafzai 
a Nobel Prize-winner and Michelle 
Obama amongst others (Stein, 2016). 
 
While human rights activists got support 
through public awareness campaigns and 
NGOs, Nigeria‟s international partners, 
such as France, US, Canada, China, UK, 
Israel and United States also volunteered 
to rescue the girls. They provided 
supplementary military support to 
augment Nigeria‟s weak counter 
terrorism prowess. They provided spy 
planes, technical experts and also sent 
Special Forces to assist Nigeria‟s efforts 
(Khan and Hamidu, 2015: 25). The US 
supported Nigeria in getting intelligence 
by providing drones and unmanned 
surveillance aircraft (Bloom and 
Matfess, 2016). The internationalisation 
and external dynamics of the activities of 
the sect also gave rise to an African-led 
International Support Mission in Mali 
(AFISMA) under the auspices of which 
Nigeria have had military involvement in 
the Sahel. The reasons for the increased 
international responses is because the 
acts of the abduction contradicted moral 
values and humanitarian principles. It 
    46 
 
Faith Olanrewaju et al                                                                                                                       CUJPIA  (2017)  5(1) 40-59 
                    
 
                       
 
 
was a crime against humanity. For Mrs. 
Michelle Obama, the immediate past 
First Lady of the United States, the act 
was “unconscionable” (The Hindu, 
2014). Unfortunately, the collaborative 
counter terrorism efforts did not yield 
positive results especially in the rescue 
of the abducted Chibok girls as over 200 
of them are still in captivity. 
 
(c) Responses of the Nigerian 
Government 
Two major approaches have been 
employed by the Nigeria state in its war 
against terror. Human Rights Watch 
(2012) describes them as the stick and 
carrot approaches.  
 
(i) Stick approaches 
 Military Engagement 
According to Udounwa (2013), Nigeria 
has engaged “kinetic strategy‟ in its war 
against Boko Haram. This strategy 
entails the use of hard military power. 
The strategies and tactics in kinetic 
operations are similar to how state actors 
conduct themselves in conventional 
warfare. This involves massed 
movement of infantry, the use of 
manoeuvres and the adherence to rules 
of engagement in war. Pruitt (2006:374) 
avers that most government prefer the 
use of core military force because it 
“requires no concessions, grants no 
legitimacy, and is consistent with the 
norm of punishing illegal violence.” Full 
military response is also used because of 
the need to protect the sovereignty of the 
state as no government will allow a 
group to usurp part of its territorial 
sovereignty.  
 
Thousands of soldiers were deployed to 
the region for direct military offensive 
against Boko Haram. The military has 
not had an easy feat in winning the war 
against the militants. The military was 
underfunded and was not adequately 
equipped with the suitable weaponry for 
that kind of warfare. Nigeria‟s former 
Chief of Defence Staff, General Martin 
Luther Agwai astutely observed that: 
“Our military is properly equipped to 
fight yesterday‟s war” (Siollun, 2015). 
President Muhammadu Buhari, Nigeria‟s 
incumbent president have achieved much 
success in the war against Boko Haram 
because the challenges the military faced 
were addressed.  
- Declaration of the State of 
Emergency 
The declaration of a state of emergency 
was necessitated by the constitutional 
obligation to restore a portion of 
Nigeria‟s territory taken over by Boko 
Haram. It involves the suspension of 
constitutional provisions relating to civic 
rights. According to section 305 (3 (c) 
(d) (f) of the Nigerian Constitution as 
amended, the President shall have power 
to issue a state of emergency only when, 
“there is actual breakdown of public 
order and public safety, there is a clear 
and present danger of an actual 
breakdown of public order and safety in 
the federation or any part to require 
extraordinary measure to restore peace 
and security or to avert such danger” 
(Nkwocha, 2012:368). In December 
2011, former President Jonathan 
declared a state of emergency in 15 local 
government areas of six northern states 
as an attempt to restore order and regain 
control of the territories taken over by 
the sect. On May 13
th
, 2013 the state of 
emergency was also declared in 
Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states. It 
was extended until November 2014 in an 
attempt to crush the Boko Haram 
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militants. However the security crisis 
continued to worsen. 
- Joint Task Force Initiatives 
At the regional level, the Multinational 
Joint Task Force (MJTF) was formed in 
March 2015 by the Federal government 
of Nigeria along Niger, Chad and 
Cameroon her immediate neighbouring 
countries under regional framework of 
Lake Chad Basin Commission. It had 
over 8,000 soldiers. 
 
The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), a 
citizen-led initiative was created on the 
rationale that strong knowledge of the 
local environment would allow the local 
population to arrest Boko Haram 
members (Okeowo, 2014). The CJTF 
mostly made up of vigilante groups, 
hunters, farmers and youths in the areas 
also complement the efforts of the 
military in degrading Boko Haram (US 
Homeland, 2013). This has been a 
crucial advantage to the MJTF that were 
not familiar with the local context or 
even local languages. The collaboration 
between the MJTF and the CJTF have 
been effective in capturing and 
neutralising hundreds of terrorists on 
many occasions. However, it is argued 
that CJTF worsened the distance 
between the State and the people.  
 
The accession of Shekau after the death 
of Mohammed Yusuf led the group to a 
more violent phase. Boko Haram began 
to employ new tactics and methods, 
including suicide-bombings which 
prompted the Nigerian government to 
establish the Special Military Joint Task 
Force (SMJTF) in 2011. It consists of 
personnel from the Nigeria Police Force 
(NPF), the Nigerian Immigration Service 
(NIS), the Department of State Security 
(DSS) and the Defence Intelligence 
Agencies (DIA) (Falode, 2016). The role 
of the SMJTF was to join forces, efforts 
and intelligence in winning the war 
against Boko Haram. 
 
 
 (ii) The Carrot Approach: 
Negotiation and the Release of the 21 
Chibok Girls  
 
The carrot approach include the use of 
peace talks and negotiations. 
Engagement in peace talks and 
negotiations with terror group is a 
common trend amongst the governments 
of the terrorism infested states. The 
federal government have engaged in 
private, public, direct and indirect 
interactions with Boko Haram over the 
release of the 21 Chibok girls and in 
ending the insurgency in general. At the 
state level, the carrot approach has 
involved proposals and reconciliations to 
Boko Haram insurgents. For instance, in 
2009 Ali Modu Sheriff former governor 
of Borno State paid N100 million naira 
to pacify the anger of the sect when their 
leader Mohammed Yusuf was killed.  
 
At the national level, the government 
have tried to bring the sect to the 
negotiation table as well as offer 
repentant ones amnesty. Late President 
Umaru Musa Yar‟Adua‟s establishment 
of a committee of inquiry led by 
Ambassador Usman Galtimari to 
ascertain the complaints of the sect and 
make likely commendations on how to 
improve security in the north-east 
(Onuoha 2012). In 2013, President 
Goodluck Jonathan set up the Committee 
on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution of 
Security Challenges in the North to 
identify and constructively engage key 
leaders of Boko Haram and to develop a 
workable framework for amnesty and 
disarmament of members of the group 
(Amaliya and Nwankpa, 2014). As 
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recommended by one of the panels, 
efforts by the government to engage the 
group in talks have failed mostly due to 
difficulties in identifying Boko Haram‟s 
demands (Thurston, 2015).  
 
At the assumption of President Buhari to 
office, there has been much silence over 
the rescue of the girls. During his media 
chat on December 2015, he disclosed 
that there were no concrete intelligence 
about the Chibok girls. Following the 
media chat, in April 2016 the sect 
released a video taken in December 
showing “about 15 chubby looking and 
relaxed Chibok girls” (Thisday, 2016). 
The government responded to this video 
with Operation Crackdown and 
bombardment of Boko Haram enclaves 
in Sambisa forest to free the girls. This 
ended with no success recorded.  
 
The government of Nigeria has had 
some failed attempted negotiation with 
Boko Haram. Shehu Sani, a civil right 
activist in northern Nigeria, was the first 
to help broker peace deal between the 
government and the sect. Secondly, by 
May 2, 2014, the then President, 
Goodluck Jonathan announced that his 
government was making uptight efforts 
to rescue the girls. The hopeful 
assurances issued by the Jonathan 
administration was countered by the 
statement issued by the sect in a video 
on May 12, 2014 in which the leader of 
Boko Haram Abubakar Shekau, was 
shown cladded by over 130 of the girls 
with a long Islamic chador and hijab, 
and called for a prisoner exchange. It 
was against the backdrop of this that 
Ahmad Salkida, a journalist, brokered a 
pact to ensure the release of the girls in 
exchange for 100 Boko Haram prisoners 
detained in various prisons in Nigeria. 
However, this plan was abandoned after 
the consultation of Goodluck Jonathan 
with United States, Israeli, British and 
French governments in Paris where it 
was agreed that force be used instead of 
prisoner exchange (Iroegbu, 2016). 
Thirdly, former Nigerian president 
Olusegun Obasanjo also attempted to 
negotiate between the sect and the 
Nigerian state. At the end of the 
negotiation, the demands by the sect 
were the prosecution of policemen 
responsible for the death of Yusuf 
Mohammed; demands for a ceasefire 
which included an end to arrests and 
killings of their member; and payments 
of compensation to families of sect 
members killed by security personnel 
(Uchehara, 2014). Fourthly, attempts 
was also made by Datti Ahmad, 
president of the National Supreme 
Council on Sharia to broker a deal 
between the Nigerian state and the sect 
in 2012 to no avail. 
 
Around August 2016, there was a ray of 
hope that came with Islamic State (ISIS) 
announcement of Abu Musab Al-
Banarwi as the new Boko Haram 
leadership. Abu Musab Al-Banarwi was 
said to be more inclined to negotiate the 
freedom of the Chibok girls in exchange 
for some of their commanders (Iroegbu, 
2016). After the negotiations brokered 
by the officials of the Swiss government 
and in which the international 
Committee of Red Cross played a 
neutral intermediary role, a date and 
location was agreed for the release of the 
girls (Ukpong, 2016). On October 13, 
2016 the nation, international 
community, concerned citizens and the 
families of the abducted girls 
experienced a happy moment that all 
have been eagerly waiting for. 21 of the 
Chibok girls abducted in 2014 were 
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released to freedom at Kumshe some 
kilometres away from Banki close to 
Nigeria‟s border with Cameroon 
(Ogundipe, 2016). It is one of the 
greatest achievements of the government 
since the beginning of the Boko Haram 
ordeal.  
 
(3) Implications of the Politics of 
the Release of the 21 Chibok Girls 
on Nigeria’s Anti-Terror War 
States negotiate with terrorists for both 
strategic and tactical reason. However, 
state-versus-terrorists negotiations has 
raised so much debates because it 
opposes the standard doctrine which 
holds that “one should not negotiate with 
terrorists”. The traditional perception 
about the relationship between the state 
and terrorists has been to launch a 
military attack on terror groups 
(Zartman, 1990 p.165). Eland (1998) 
avers that “most attention has been 
focused on combating terrorism by 
deterring and disrupting it beforehand as 
well as retaliating against it after any 
attack on the state.” Less attention has 
been paid to what motivates terrorists to 
launch attacks against innocent citizens 
and the state. In line with this traditional 
view on state-terror groups negotiation is 
the concept of the war on terror and 
Ronald Reagan‟s debates on negotiating 
with terrorists. The Regan debate is that:  
America will never make 
concessions to terrorists. To do 
so would only invite more 
terrorism, once we head down 
that path there would be no 
end to it, no end to the 
suffering of innocent people, 
no end to the bloody ransom 
all civilized nations must 
pay (Cambanis, 2010).  
 
The Regan debate summaries the 
traditional position on state-terrorists 
negotiations. While the issue of states 
negotiating with terrorists is a complex 
one, various reasons have been attributed 
to the why democratic states must never 
do such. In the actual fact, states detest 
negotiations with terrorists because 
terrorism is an overt disrespect for state 
sovereignty. Negotiation with terrorists 
is unacceptable and illegal because of 
their affection for violence, disrespect 
for the principle of the rule of law and 
other legal framework (Hoxha, 2015). 
By 2001 president George Bush stated 
that the only way to deal with terrorists 
whose only goal is deaths is to bring 
them to justice which definitely is not by 
talking to or negotiating with them but 
punishing them (Bush, 2003). In 2004, 
Vladimir Putin, a former president of the 
Russian Federation, stated that “the 
universally recognized method of 
fighting terrorism is denying any 
negotiations with terrorists because any 
contact with them encourages 
committing new, bloodier crimes” 
(Putin, 2004). Similar perception was 
also held by Nigeria‟s former President 
Goodluck Jonathan, who saw the 
violence and hostage taking of women 
and children as the declaration of war 
against Nigeria and the undermining of 
the authority of the state. In response to 
this, Goodluck Jonathan vowed to take 
all necessary action to putting an end to 
the impunity of terrorists in Nigeria. 
 
Other arguments includes that arriving at 
a middle ground is a support of violence 
as well as an avenue of rewarding 
terrorists. Democracies must never give 
in to violence, and terrorists must never 
be rewarded for using it. It is also argued 
that negotiating with terrorists tends to 
legitimise or justify the terror group and 
undermine the actors that pursue 
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political change through peaceful means 
(Toros, 2008: 408; Neumann, 2007). 
Martha Crenshaw (1983: 25) argues that 
“the power of terrorism is through 
political legitimacy, winning acceptance 
in the eyes of a significant population 
and discrediting the government‟s 
legitimacy.” As such Toros (2008: 408) 
opines that such a course of action would 
legitimize the terrorists and set a bad 
precedence. In practice, there are cases 
of democratic governments that 
negotiated with terrorists. The British 
government maintained a secret back 
channel to the Irish Republican Army 
even after the IRA had launched a 
mortar attack on 10 Downing Street that 
nearly eliminated the entire British 
cabinet in 1991. In 1988, the Spanish 
government dialogued and negotiated 
with the separatist group Basque 
Homeland and Freedom only six months 
after the group had killed 21 shoppers in 
a supermarket bombing. In 1993, the 
Israeli government secretly negotiated 
the Oslo accords even though the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
continued to launch its terrorist 
campaign and refused to recognize 
Israel‟s right to exist. The US negotiated 
with the Taliban for the release of Bowe 
Bergdahl (Neumann, 2007). 
 
Hayes (2002) avows that state-terror 
group negotiation mostly occurs in 
hostage situations like that of the Chibok 
girls. Prisoners are used as instruments 
to achieve strategic gains. Put 
differently, hostages have strategic 
values as assets that are often used as 
negotiation tools. The use of hostages as 
a point of strength in negotiations is a 
common trend in terror groups. Whether 
the Nigerian government should 
negotiation with Boko Haram generated 
mixed reactions from Nigerians. 
According to Agbiboa and Maiangwa 
(2014), a survey conducted by CLEEN 
Foundation in August 2012 projected the 
public opinions of Nigerians on whether 
the government should dialogue with 
Boko Haram or not. The northern and 
southern parts of Nigeria were divided 
over the acceptance of negotiation. 
Opinions from southern Nigeria averred 
that there should be no negotiation with 
the sect, rather force should would be 
more effective in dealing with the 
terrorist organisation. Opinions from 
Northern Nigeria asked for negotiation 
contending that a coercive strategy 
would be ineffective in resolving the 
insurgency. Definitely, the reasons for 
the varying opinions between the north 
and the south is not far-fetched. Support 
for negotiation in the north could be 
because of the intensity of the attacks in 
the region, the high rate of deaths, 
maiming, displacement, general violence 
and terror experienced by the civilians in 
the region. On the other hand, the south 
could afford to reject negotiation 
because the north has been the terrain of 
the violence and therefore has not 
experienced the terror the North 
experienced from the insurgency.  
 
The failure of warfare led the Nigerian 
government to ensure a successful 
negotiation with the sect. Finally, after 
intense dialogue and compromises 21 of 
the Chibok girls have been freed during 
the current administration of President 
Mohammadu Buhari. With no clues 
from the partners in the talks, Nigerians 
amidst the jubilation with the families of 
the girls only speculated what the deal 
would have involved. In the light of the 
above, a public opinion on Premium 
Times News (2016) discussion forum 
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argues that President Buhari sees the 
release of the girls as a medium for the 
release of Sunni terrorists. A Nigerian 
who mediated previous failed 
negotiation attempts between the 
Nigerian government and Boko Haram 
stated that the Swiss government paid 
some “handsome ransom” to the tune of 
millions of dollars on behalf of the 
Nigerian authorities for the release of the 
girls. The minister of information 
Mohammad Lai, representing the 
Nigeria government claimed that no 
ransom was paid for the girls and Boko 
Haram commanders were not released in 
exchange for the girls (Okakwu, 2016). 
The Minister credited the release of the 
21 Chibok girls to “painstaking 
negotiation and trust on both sides” 
(Campbell, 2016).  
 
The fact remains that negotiation 
involves compromise. Negotiation is a 
direct process of dialogue and discussion 
taking place at least between two parties 
who are faced with a conflict situation or 
dispute. The goal of the parties involved 
in the negotiation is to arrive at an 
agreement on the causes of the conflict 
between them (Best, 2007:105 cited in 
Obiajulu, 2011). Self-interest of the 
parties underpins the negotiation process 
but it often ends in the show of empathy 
to the other party. The continuation of 
warfare between the state security forces 
and the Boko Haram as well as the 
release of another 82 hostages by the 
sect buttresses the speculations that the 
Nigerian government paid some forms of 
due to Boko Haram. Iroegbu (2016) 
opines that “it is an arranged prisoner 
exchange programme.” Supporting this 
stance, Okakwu (2016) avers that there 
are signs to prove that four Boko Haram 
prisoners were exchanged for the girls in 
Banki in North-East Nigeria. This also 
brings to the fore a statement issued by 
the sect months before the release of the 
girls that the girls would only be released 
as exchanges for Boko Haram 
commanders (Al Jazeera, 2016). 
 
Premium Times News (2016) discussion 
forum contends that there is a 
relationship between Boko Haram and 
President Buhari. Nigel (2016) argued 
that the release of the girls is a political 
strategy for the retention of political 
power and office (cited in Premium 
Times News, 2016). The argument also 
follows that the gradual release of the 
girls by Boko Haram is to make 
Nigerians believe that the president and 
his party are effective and should be 
voted for in the forthcoming general 
elections in 2019. Nonetheless, the 
#BringBackOurGirls campaigners avers 
that the release of the 21 girls confirms 
the development of the capacity of the 
government in the anti-terror war. Karen 
Bass, a member of the House Foreign 
Affairs Sub-committee on Africa and a 
member of the United States Congress 
avers that:  
The release of 21 Chibok 
young women from the grips 
of the terrorist group Boko 
Haram into the custody of the 
state services department is 
bittersweet news. The 
negotiations – brokered by the 
International Red Cross and 
the Swiss government – have 
resulted in the greatest 
breakthrough since the 
beginning of this ordeal. 
However, I join the rest of my 
colleagues in wanting to see 
the release of the remaining 
197 girls who remain in 
captivity and are still enduring 
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systematic abuse, rape, and 
forced labor at the hands of 
these militants (Okakwu and 
Ukpong, 2016).  
This paper takes a position that it is 
wrong to view negotiation, mediation, 
and dialogue with terrorist groups like 
Boko Haram as a sign of weakness or 
compromise for the acceptance of 
violence. This is because it was wise for 
the option of negotiation and other 
methods of conflict resolutions to be 
embrace when over the years the use of 
force have failed. As terror groups are 
founded on imagined or real demands, 
dialogue helps state to understand the 
demands and grievances as well as 
conveys a message of the understanding 
of their plights by the state. However, 
the release of the Boko Haram 
commanders poses security risk to the 
Nigerian state as the act is an 
empowerment of the sect for more 
violence. Since the released commanders 
are not repentant or ex-members of the 
sect they remain enemies of the state and 
would act against the peaceful existence 
of the state as they did before their 
arrest.  
 
This paper aligns with one of the 
arguments of the traditional state-
terrorist negotiation thoughts that the 
release of hostages does not mean the 
victory of the state over the terrorist 
group. The release of the 21 Chibok girls 
is not equal to the victory over the 
insurgency. However, the Nigerian state 
has attached the release of the girls to 
part of the criteria for measuring its 
victory over terrorism. Contrary to the 
state-centric analysis of the implications 
of the state-versus-terror group 
negotiation, the paper contends that it is 
not the actual act of negotiation that 
encourages terrorism and the reuse of 
terror tactics by terror groups but the 
degree to which terrorist groups is able 
to achieve their demands via negotiation. 
The negotiation may strengthen the 
faction in the insurgent group that is in 
favour of non-violent and political 
solution or engagement. Negotiation 
could draw insurgent groups down a 
path of change, moderation or 
transformation towards non-violence. 
Weiss (2003) argues that the acceptance 
and willingness for terrorists to negotiate 
occurs after a realisation that its goals 
are unachievable. Therefore agreeing to 
negotiate portrays that the organisation is 
weak; connotes the possibility of 
changing their ideological position and 
strategy as well. Hence, Weiss argues 
that rather than dwelling on the negative 
effects as perceived by the traditional 
school of thought, negotiation could be a 
platform for states‟ victory over 
insurgent groups- to bring terrorists to 
positive change. On this note, while the 
swap of the girls represents an 
achievement for the BBOG campaign, it 
shows that negotiating with moderate 
elements within the Boko Haram could 
be explored by the Nigerian government 
to win the war on terror in Nigeria. The 
Nigerian government need to engage the 
moderate group of Boko Haram in 
discussing the sources of their 
grievances which will be addressed via 
effective policies.  
 
Negotiation theory states that negotiation 
should be carried out by experts from 
various but relevant segments of the 
society. On the contrary, the negotiation 
between the government and Boko 
Haram was conducted by politicians. 
The National Security Agency (NSA) 
assured that the government engeged the 
    53 
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right set of people which does not 
include the military. As such the 
negotiation was a political decision and 
the military continued military combat 
against Boko Haram (Saharareporters, 
2016). This position is a deviation from 
the traditional model of state-versus-
terrorists negotiation. Modern perception 
on state-terror group negotiation states 
opines that sole dependent on military 
action is an inadequate strategy for 
winning the war on terror. Military 
solution can never solve the problems. 
The establishment of the amnesty 
Committee reflects President Goodluck 
Jonathan‟s acknowledgment that purely 
military means cannot resolve the 
current impasse (Thurston, 2013). 
Military actions are inadequate because 
most of the wars is usually caused by 
political, social, economic reasons. The 
paper argues that the success of the 
military in the theatre of war was of 
great help to the success of the 
negotiation.  
 
 
Conclusion  
Many modern-day governments have 
insisted time after time that they will not 
negotiate with terrorists which in 
practice have not been so. Over the 
years, calls from the Nigerian 
government, individuals, international 
agencies and the global communities for 
negotiations with Boko Haram for the 
release of the girls have failed. The 
sudden willingness of the sect to 
negotiate with the government for the 
release of the girls in batches is quite 
surprising and calls for caution. It brings 
Nigeria to a decisive point or juncture of 
whether it will win the war on terror or 
not. Subsequent upon the conclusion of 
this study, the following 
recommendations are put forward: 
 
The fight against insurgency and anti-
insurgency policies should be 
implemented by experts. Prior to the 
release of the girls most of the anti-
insurgency efforts involved the use of 
force. On the other hand, the negotiation 
deals have been strictly political. Both 
approaches although crucial to defeating 
the insurgency have their weaknesses 
and effects on the fight against terror in 
Nigeria. This paper proposes that there 
should be a firm relationship between 
the military anti-insurgency strategies 
and political negotiation. For effective 
counter-terrorism operations, the 
obviously existing politico-military 
institutional divisions should be 
addressed in further negotiations with 
terror groups. 
 
The Nigerian government should 
understand that negotiation cannot bring 
the Boko Haram insurgency to an end as 
it is not an all effective instrument in 
curbing terrorism. Certainly, buying the 
entirety or part of the group off does not 
epitomize a long-term solution. There is 
no absolute guarantee that the hard core 
of fighters would be bought off via 
negotiations. Rather, a long lasting 
solution to the insurgency should address 
the causes of their grievances which are 
fundamental political, economic, and 
social problems rooted in society. 
 
Lastly, while negotiation should not be 
completely ignored as an approach to 
resolving contending issues, the 
government needs to understand that the 
release of hostages is not the ultimate 
goal of the terrorists but is a symbolism 
or an avenue for the establishment of 
their influence. The government 
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however need to understand that the 
negotiation also offers it the opportunity 
to exert influence. It should therefore try 
to construct an outcome that is better 
than the current status quo. In the light of 
the above, Nigeria needs to develop a 
well drafted strategy of engagement that 
will be used for future negotiation. The 
strategies should ensure that the 
sovereignty of the state and other rights 
the state enjoys within international laws 
are not compromised. 
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